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COMMENTS
THE PREPAID INTEREST DEDUCTION VIEWED FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
by David 1. Graham
Real estate transactions have played a significant role in shaping the
existing law regarding the deductibility of prepaid interest. The flourishing
real estate market of the middle to late sixties was enhanced by the tax
benefi-ts of prepaid interest,' and the tax avoidance use of the prepaid
interest deduction became notorious through its connection with real estate
tax shelters.2 In 1968 the Internal Revenue Service responded to this form
of tax avoidance by issuing Revenue Ruling 68-6433 which reversed its long-
standing position that prepaid interest is deductible by a cash basis taxpayer
in the year of payment. The ruling provides that a deduction will not be
allowed for interest prepaid for more than twelve months beyond the taxable
year in question as it constitutes a material distortion of income. While the
abuses which existed prior to the issuance of the ruling mandated some
change in the law, serious questions have arisen as to the validity of the
Service's automatic disallowance approach.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the trends of the law of
prepaid interest from the perspective of the real estate tax shelter and to
suggest the direction in which the law should develop in this area. Part I
illustrates the use and advantages of prepaid interest in real estate transac-
tions. A presentation of the general development of the law of prepaid
interest is provided in part 11, including an indication of the abuses which led
to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 68-643 and a discussion of the specific
provisions of that ruling. Part III deals with the law affecting prepaid interest
subsequent to 1968 and particularly with the judicial cognizance of the 1968
revenue ruling. An analysis of the various theories on which a prepaid
1. Prepaid interest refers to the payment of interest on an indebtedness before that
interest accrues. The tax advantage of such a technique depends upon the ability of
the taxpayer to take a deduction for the amount paid. A prepaid interest acquisition
has been defined as one involving (1) an acquisition in which the buyer's promissory
note represents most of the purchase price and (2) the buyer's prepayment of several
years' interest on the purchase money note. See Kaster, Prepaid Interest Purchase
Method Still Useful Despite IRS Attack, 30 J. TAx. 16 (1969).
2. A tax shelter transaction is one -designed to reduce tax liability by generating
deductions in excess of income, thereby "sheltering" high bracket income which has ac-
crued from other sources. Real estate investments have traditionally been regarded as
attractive tax shelters because of the potential deductions such as accelerated deprecia-
tion and prepaid interest. For a discussion of several limitations on the use of tax shel-
ters enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 487, see Cunnane, Tax Shelter
Investments After the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 49 TAXES 450 (1971). The proposed Tax
Equity Act of 1975 limits tax shelter aspects of rental property by requiring the capi-
talization of interest and taxes incurred during periods of construction of rental property
rather than allowing the current deduction of such expenses. See H.R. 1040, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
3. 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76.
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interest deduction may be disallowed in the context of real estate transac-
tions is included in part IV. In part V some conclusions are drawn regarding
the validity of the 'Internal Revenue Service's approach to the ruling in light
of the abuses which precipitated its issuance and the disparate approaches of
the courts and the Service in applying the material distortion of income
theory. Finally, the trends and impact of future decisions on the prepaid
interest deduction are considered.
I. THE PREPAID INTEREST DEDUCTION
The statutory foundation for the interest deduction consists of a clear and
simple statement in section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code: "There shall
be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year
on indebtedness."'4 The Code does not provide a definition of the word
"interest" but the term is regarded by the courts and by the Internal
Revenue Service as meaning "the amount which one has contracted to pay
for the use, forbearance, or detention of money." 5  The basic statutory
provision is broad,6 allowing a deduction for interest in the year paid or
accrued, provided that the interest arises from a genuine indebtedness 7 and
that the payment is actually interest rather than a disguised payment of
principal.8
Assuming that these fundamental requirements are met, the cash basis
taxpayer may have a useful tax-planning device through his control over 'the
timing of an interest deduction.) The timing decision essentially involves
choosing the tax year in which the interest payment is to be made. For
example, a taxpayer expecting to have a greater need for a deduction in the
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a).
5. Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932); cf. Deputy v. DuPont,
308 U.S. 488 (1940); Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 49; Rev. Rul. 71-98, 1971-
1 CuM. BULL. 57; Rev. Rul. 69-290, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 55; Rev. Rul. 69-189, 1969-
1 CUM. BULL. 55; Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 54. The Internal Revenue
Code provides several specific limitations on the interest deduction. See, e.g., INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 264 (limitation of interest deduction for interest incurred in connection
with life insurance contracts); id. § 265 (limitation on interest deduction arising in con-
nection with tax exempt interest income); id. § 269 (limitation on interest deduction
arising in connection with corporate acquisitions).
6. There is no statutory requirement that the interest deduction be reasonable in
amount. See, e.g., Dorzback v. Collison, 195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952) (payment of 25%
of profits as interest held to be deductible under § 163). Furthermore, the deduction
may be taken regardless of whether the indebtedness is incurred 'for a business purpose.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a). But see notes 55-58 infra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the purposive activity doctrine.
7. See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text. The courts will look through
form to the true nature of the payment to determine whether the amount paid is interest.
See, e.g., Autenreith v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'g 41 B.T.A.
319 (1940); Norman Titcher, 57 T.C. 315 (1971); L-R Heat Treating Co., 28 T.C. 894
(1957).
9. For accrual basis taxpayers the timing of an interest deduction provides no tax
advantages since interest accrues ratably over time and is deductible when accrued. Fur-
thermore, interest must be accrued pro rata over the life of the loan. See, e.g., James
Bros. Coal Co., 41 T.C. 917 (1964). However, if the interest calculation is subject to
the "Rule of 78's" then it may be accrued on that basis. Rev. Rul. 74-395, 1974 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 33, at 9. The rule of 78's is an interest computation method by which
interest accrual is greater during the first part of the loan than in the latter. See Rev.
Rul. 72-100, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 122.
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year following the one in which the interest accrues may simply delay the
payment until the following year. Similarly, a taxpayer may wish to obtain a
deduction by prepaying interest before it accrues on an indebtedness. The
tax consequences of creating a current deduction through the prepayment of
interest are amplified if the payment is made for interest which will accrue
over a number of years. The prepayment of interest is especially attractive if
the taxpayer is in a high income bracket in the year of payment but expects
his income to drop in subsequent years. The effect in such a situation is to
reduce the overall amount of taxes ultimately paid since -the deduction is
used to set off high-bracket income. Thus, while the prepayment of interest
may generally be thought of as a technique to delay the payment of taxes,
the result in some situations may be to actually reduce the total amount of
taxes paid over a period of years.
,Interest is often prepaid in connection with real estate transactions,
frequently involving the purchase of raw land with little or no downpay-
ment. 10 For example, a cash basis taxpayer in a high income bracket might
purchase real estate under a contract of sale calling for interest only for
several years, payable at closing. Thus, the purchaser would attempt to
furnish consideration in the form of interest since the actual cost of acquisi-
tion to him will be lessened by the amount of taxes saved in consequence of
the interest deduction." Of course, there are tax consequences for the seller
as well as the buyer in such a transaction. The receipt of interest payments
will constitute ordinary income to the seller. In contrast, if the purchaser's
available funds were used as a downpayment on principal, the payment
might constitute a tax-free return of capital depending on the seller's basis, or
a capital gain if the amount received exceeded the seller's basis and the
property qualified as a section 122112 or section 123 113 asset. A number of
factors may operate to make a prepaid interest transaction economically
sound for the seller. For example, the seller's income in the year of receipt
may have been unusually low, or he may have current or carryover
operating losses which offset the receipt of income. Furthermore, the pur-
chase price may be inflated with a decreased -interest rate to alleviate the
unfavorable impact of receiving ordinary income. The frequent use of the
prepaid interest technique in real estate tax shelters indicates that these and
other factors have operated to make such transactions beneficial to both
buyers and sellers.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF PREPAM INTEREST
Because of the general nature of section 16314 and the brevity of the
10. Such transactions may involve particular facts which would bring into operation
certain limitations on the deductibility of the interest paid. For example, if the property
purchased is classified as investment property the restrictions of section 163(d) may op-
erate to limit the deduction. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163(b).
11. The tax advantages of the prepaid interest deduction may be amplified by cer-
tain property acquisition and financing techniques, such as the wrap-around mortgage.
See Barnett, Use of the Wrap-around Mortgage in Realty Sales: The Tax Advantages
and Problems, 40 J. TAX. 274 (1974).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 122t (definition of capital asset):.
13. Id. § 1231 (property held for use in a trade or business).
14. Id. § 163.
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applicable Treasury Regulations,", the law of prepaid interest depends
primarily upon the interaction of judicial decisions with the position of the
'Internal 'Revenue Service on certain matters. In this section the specific
authority for the deduction of prepaid interest is considered and contrasted
with the treatment of other prepaid items; the judicial interpretation of
section 163 which acts to prevent misuse of the interest deduction is
discussed; and finally, Revenue Ruling 68-64316 is examined.
A. Authority for the Prepaid Interest Deduction
Judicial sanction of the deductibility of interest prepaid on a bona fide
indebtedness began with the Board of Tax Appeals decision in John D.
Wackler.17 The cash basis taxpayer in Fackler secured a reduced interest
rate on an indebtedness by paying two years of interest in advance. The
Commissioner contended that the deduction should be disallowed because it
would create a material distortion of income. The basic conflict in Fackler
was one of reconciling the statutory allowance of an interest deduction in the
year in which payment was made with the statutory preclusion of the use of
an accounting method which did not clearly reflect income.' 8 The Commis-
sioner would have required the taxpayer to change his method of accounting
with respect to the prepaid interest item in order to properly reflect income.
This would mean that the interest would be amortized and deducted as it
accrued. However, the Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Commissioner's
position, holding that the prepayments did not distort income.1 9 The court
viewed some mismatching of income as inherent in the cash method of
accounting and considered it improper to place the taxpayer on an accrual
method for only the prepaid interest item. In reaching its conclusion, the
court analogized to the treatment of postpaid interest and stated that the
deduction of prepaid interest would distort income no more than would the
deduction of a current payment of interest which had accrued in previous
years. 20
Fackler was followed in 1943 by the Tax Court opinion in Court Holding
Co.,2 1 in which the cash basis taxpayer's right to deduct a prepayment of
15. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1 (1966).
16. 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76.
17. 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939 CuM. BULL. 12. Two years prior
to Fackler the question of deductibility of prepaid interest arose in a Board of Tax Ap-
peals decision which was contrary to the holding in Fackler. R.L. Blaffer, 6 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 297 (1937). Although Blaller was not expressly overruled in Fackler, it sub-
sequently was regarded as obsolete.
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 41, 53 Stat. 24. The corresponding section in
the 1954 Code is nearly identical to the 1939 version, providing that "if the method i[of
accounting] used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income
shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate,
does clearly reflect income." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(b).
19. 39 B.T.A. at 395.
20. Id. at 398.
21. 2 T.C. 531 (1943), acquiesced in, 1943 CuM. BULL. 5. Although the issue re-
garding the interest deduction was not appealed, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tax
Court's holding that the sale of assets formally accomplished by the shareholders would
be attributed to the corporation. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945). Court Holding Co. is regarded as a leading case for the proposition that tax
consequences will be attached to the substance of a transaction rather than the form.
1975]
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interest was again upheld. In 1945 the Commissioner apparently capitulated
on the prepaid interest issue by publishing Income Tax Ruling 3740,22
which provided that a cash basis taxpayer could properly deduct a five-year
prepayment of interest. It is unclear why the five-year period was chosen in
light of the shorter periods involved in Fackler and Court Holding Co. 23
However, what is significant is that taxpayers were given the assurance that
prepaid interest was deductible without the risk of challenge by the Commis-
sioner. Several cases were decided after the issuance of Income Tax Ruling
3740 which further secured the deductibility of prepaid interest. 24 This
strong judicial precedent, along with Income Tax Ruling 3740, firmly
established the right of the taxpayer to deduct prepaid interest, 25 creating a
significant tax saving opportunity which was perhaps too attractive, and the
interest deduction suffered serious abuse.
B. Treatment of Other Prepaid Expenses
The allowance of a current deduction for prepaid interest is unique in
contrast to the treatment of several other prepaid expenses. Prepaid rent has
been held to be an investment in an asset with a life extending into future
years. 26 Therefore the rental prepayments were required to be amortized
over the period for which the rental was paid rather than being currently
expensed. The Tax Court in University Properties, Inc. 27 concluded: "Rent-
als may be deducted as such only for the year or years to which they are
applied. If they are paid for the continued use of the property beyond the
years in which paid they are not deductible in full in the year paid but must
be deducted ratably over the years during which the property is so used."'28
22. 1945 CuM. BULL. 109. The position taken by the Service in the ruling was
stated: "[lit is held that where a taxpayer keeps his books of account and files Federal
income tax returns on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, interest paid in advance
for a period of five years constitutes an allowable deduction for Federal income tax pur-
poses for the year in which paid. . . ." Id.
23. The taxpayer in Fackler deducted only two years of prepaid interest; Court
Holding Co. involved a payment of $350 denominated a "rent discount" on a three-year
lease. One might speculate that the Commissioner was somewhat discouraged by the
outcome of previous litigation of prepaid interest questions and was attempting to at least
establish a maximum on the prepaid interest deduction that the courts would observe.
24. Clifford F. Hood, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1245 (1961); L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C
1 (1960); ct. Joseph H. Konigsberg, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49 (1946). The Konigsberg
case was decided shortly after the issuance of Income Tax Ruling 3740 but did not cite
the ruling as authority for the deductability of prepaid interest, citing only Fackler for
the proposition. The deductibility of prepaid interest was not at issue in the case but
does illustrate the court's cognizance and reaffirmance of Fackler.
25. Allowance of the prepaid interest deduction for four years' interest was recog-
nized as late as 1968 by the Tax Court, where it noted that the Commissioner had al-
lowed the prepaid interest deduction for the interest payment but disallowed the claimed
deduction for other prepaid charges. George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Southwestern Hotel Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 703 (1941); Main & McKinney Bldg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 113 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 (1940); University Properties,
Inc., 45 T.C. 416 (1966), aff'd, 378 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1967); Lola Cunningham, 39
T.C. 186 (1962); Henry Cartan, 30 T.C. 308 (1958). Other cases have denied the de-
duction of prepaid rental on the grounds that the prepayment is not an ordinary and
necessary business expense. Galatoire Bros. v. Lines, 23 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1928); Ba-
ton Coal Co., 19 B.T.A. 169 (1930), aft'd, 51 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 674 (1931).
27. 45 T.C. 416 (1966), af!'d, 378 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1967).
28. 45 T.C. at 421. Payments made by a lessor which relate to a' lease, such as
416 [Vol. 29
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Prepaid insurance premiums have also been held to be amortizable over the
period of time in which the insurance policy is in effect. The First Circuit, in
Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n,29 reached this result, stating that
"the payments are prorated primarily because the life of the asset extends
beyond the taxable year . . . and a full deduction in the year' of payment
would distort his income."'30  However, in Waldheim Realty & Investment
Co. v. Commissioner"' the Eighth Circuit rejected the capitalization theory
advanced in Boylston. The court stated that the amortization statutes should
not be stretched to include items which do not fall within the capital asset
classification. 32  The court observed that the insurance premiums add
nothing to the taxpayer's plant or equipment or his ability to produce
income, whereas prepaid items such as rent, lease bonuses, and commissions
are for the purpose of providing -the taxpayer a place to conduct business.38
Thus, the court concluded that the prepaid insurance premiums should not
be treated as capital expenditures, and held that the payments were business
expenses deductible by the cash basis taxpayer in the year of payment.3 4
An interesting series of cases exists regarding prepayments for animal
feed. Deductions for such prepayments have been disallowed on the theory
that they were not "paid" but were simply deposits made for future
payments. 35 A critical factor in the cases disallowing such deductions was
that the payments were refundable if not earned through future delivery of
feed. For example, in Mann v. Commissioner3 6 the Eighth Circuit allowed
the deduction of the prepayments as an ordinary and necessary business
expense, distinguishing its decision in Shippy v. United States37 as involving
only a refundable deposit rather than an actual payment.38 In addition to
the payment requirement, an underlying consideration in the decision of
whether a deduction may be taken is whether income would be materially
distorted. In John Ernst3 9 the prepayments were held to be deductible since
they were not refundable and because the taxpayer's consistent practice of
making such prepayments lessened the distorting effects which would re-
sult.40 The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that prepay-
ments for feed to be used in a later year may be ,currently deductible, but
fees paid to a real estate broker as compensation for securing a lessee have been required
to be amortized also. See, e.g., Seahill Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 408 (1964); Byron
J. Farwell, 35 T.C. 454 (1960); Central Bank Block Ass'n, 19 B.T.A. 1183 (1930),
aff'd, 57 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1932).
29. 131 F.2d966 (lstCir. 1942).
30. Id. at 968. The leading case on the deductibility of prepaid insurance premi-
ums, also decided by the First Circuit, was Welsh v. DeBlois, 94 F.2d 842 (1st Cir.
1938), which sustained the taxpayer's claim for a deduction of such prepayments. Welsh
v. DeBlois was expressly overruled in the Boylston Market decision. 131 F.2d at 968.
31. 245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957).
32. Id. at 825.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 828.
35. See Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962); Tim W. Lillie, 45
T.C. 54 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 370 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1966); R.D. Cravens, 30 T.C.
903 (1958), rev'd, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959).
36. 483 F.2d 673 (8thCir. 1973).
37. 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962).
38. 483 F.2d at 681; cf. Gadis v. United States, 330 F. Supp, 741 (S.D. Miss. 1971).
39. 32 T.C. 181 (1959).
40. Id. at 186-87.
1975]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
only if the taxpayer can show that a bona fide payment has been made for a
valid business purpose and that no material distortion of income will result.41
Certain other expenses are considered deductible upon prepayment, such
as intangible drilling expenses 42 and prepaid state taxes. 43 Thus, there is no
general consistency to the law regarding the deductibility of advanced
payments and no common principle which renders the results predictable. 44
The rationale of treating some prepaid expenses as amortizable capital
expenditures and others as currently deductible expenses is anomalous and
gives rise to a tension regarding the proper tax treatment for any prepaid
'expense.
C. Judicial Interpretation of Section 163
After the issuance of Income Tax Ruling 3740,45 taxpayers began to
explore the limits of the interest deduction as a tax planning device. A large
body of case law has developed dealing with situations in which the taxpayer
exceeded reasonable limits. Although many of these cases involved transac-
tions in which deductions were claimed for prepaid interest, they were
resolved on issues dealing with the bona fides of the transaction since there
was no objection to the deductibility of prepaid interest as such at that
time.46
Section 163 requires that an actua indebtedness exist on which ,the
interest arises in order for the deduction to be taken.47 Where a purported
indebtedness has no economic reality a court is likely to classify the
indebtedness as a sham, as illustrated by the famous "Livingstone cases,
' 48
which involved attempts by taxpayers to exploit the interest deduction. The
basic scheme in each of these cases consisted of a complicated series of
41. See Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. NO. 17, at 15 (published after the
Tenth Circuit's reversal of the injunction prohibiting publication of the ruling, Cattle
Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 504 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'g 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
% 9121 (W.D. Okla. 1973)). For more extensive treatment of the tax questions involv-
ing prepayments of feed expenses, see Hawkinson, Farm Expenses and General Account-
ing Principles, 22 TAx L. REv. 237 (1967); Pinney & Olsen, Farmers' Prepaid Feed Ex-
penses, 25 TAX LAW. 537 (1972).
42. See Pauley v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9280 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Rev.
Rul. 71-252, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 146, revoking Rev. Rul. 53-170, 1953-2 CuM. BULL.
141.;43. See, e.g., George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968); Estate of Aaron Lowenstein,
12 T.C. 694-(1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 CuM. BULL. 2, a! 'd sub nom. First Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911
(1951); Lillian Bacon Glassell, 12 T.C. 232 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 CuM. BULL.
2; United States Playing Card Co., 15 B.T.A. 975 (1929); Rev. Ru. 71-190, 1971-1
CuM. BULL. 70.
44. Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973).
45. 1945 CuM. BULL. 109.
46. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Eli D. Goodstein, 30
T.C. 1178 (1958), aft'd, 267 F.2d 127 (lst Cir. 1959).
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
48. M. Eli Livingstone was a securities dealer in Boston who developed a plan that
offered high income taxpayers the prospect of reducing taxes at relatively low cost.
Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959). The courts have dealt with the
transactions engineered by Livingstone in a number of cases. See, e.g., Becker v. Com-
missioner, 277 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1960); Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1959); Sonnabend v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1959); Goodstein v. Com-
missioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959); Broome v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 613
(Ct. Cl. 1959); John Fox, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1006 (1958).
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transactions engineered to provide the taxpayer with an interest deduction
and capital gain. Usually the taxpayer would purchase government obliga-
tions with borrowed funds paying interest in advance on the loan. In Eli D.
Goodstein,49 the first of the "Livingstone cases," the taxpayer claimed a
deduction for interest paid on a loan arranged to finance the purchase of
treasury notes. Although the rate of interest paid on the loan was higher than
that received from the treasury notes, Goodstein hoped to make up more
than the difference by offsetting the interest deductions against other high-
bracket income. The 'First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding that
Goodstein was not entitled to the claimed deduction for two reasons. First,
there was never in substance a purchase of the treasury notes or an actual
borrowing of funds.50 Second, even if the transaction was recognized as
having substance, there was no payment of interest since the taxpayer
tendered only notes for the interest due.51 The Commissioner's victory in
Goodstein was significant because the holding contributed to the develop-
ment of the doctrine that the courts are not bound to recognize an indebted-
ness incurred solely to reduce tax liability.
In Knetsch v. United States52 the Supreme Court added another element
to the sham transaction doctrine. The taxpayer had purchased annuity
contracts which would increase in cash-surrender or loan value at a fixed
rate until a specified maturity date. The proceeds used to purchase the
annuity contracts were loaned by the same insurance company that issued
the contracts, and further, the interest payments were borrowed back by the
taxpayer. The Court stated that there was nothing "of substance to be
realized . . . beyond a tax deduction," and therefore found that the
transaction was a sham.5 3 Thus, under Knetsch, even where an indebtedness
actually exists, the interest deduction may be struck down if the transaction
lacks economic substance apart from the tax benefits created.
54
49. 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
50. Id. at 131. The Tax Court found that there was no borrowing since the lender
had no funds to lend and that no obligation existed because Goodstein was not person-
ally liable for payment of the note. Eli D. Goodstein, 30 T.C. 1178, 1188 (1958), aff'd,
267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959). The complicated fact situation in Goodstein is carefully
analyzed in Harrar, Is Interest Deductible Only if the Debt Has a Nontax Profit Pur-
pose?, 13 J. TAx. 258 (1960).
51. 267 F.2d at 131; cf. James W. England, Jr., 34 T.C. 617 (1960) (deduction dis-
allowed on grounds that no "payment" was made where the interest obligation was sat-
isfied by borrowing additional funds from the creditor); accord, Nat Harrison Associ-
ates, Inc., 42 T.C. 601 (1964) (interest deduction denied where borrower's loan was in-
creased and lender drew two checks, one was kept in payment of accrued interest on
the previously outstanding amount and the other remitted to the borrower). But see
Newton A. Burgess, 8 T.C. 47 (1947) (deduction allowed where the taxpayer received
additional funds from the creditor and subsequently issued his own check in payment
of interest).
52. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
53. Id. at 366.
54. The scope of the Knetsch case was left open to question. For example, it is
not clear from the opinion whether the beneficial interest apart from the tax benefits
was to be measured by the taxpayer's subjective motivation or by objective analysis of
the transaction. Furthermore, questions remained as to whether a mere possibility of
some before-tax profit would satisfy the beneficial interest test and, if so, how slight
might that possibility be and meet the Knetsch requirement. For subsequent cases deal-
ing with these questions see Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963),
aff'g 39 T.C. 1064 (1963) (some reasonable hope of a nontax benefit). But see Min-
chin v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1964), affg 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 517
19751
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Six years after Knetsch, the Second Circuit, in Goldstein v. Commis-
sioner,55 disallowed the deduction of interest paid on an indebtedness
because the loan was not incurred to engage in a "purposive activity"
other than an attempt to obtain an interest deduction.5 6 The taxpayer had
secured a large loan using the proceeds to purchase government obligations.
Interest on the loan was prepaid with funds which had been won in a
sweepstakes contest. When the government obligations were sold, the debt
was repaid and the unearned interest was refunded. The court held that the
transactions were not shams and found that a genuine indebtedness exist-
ed.57 However, since there was no purpose other than an attempt to secure
an interest deduction, the deduction was disallowed.58 Goodstein, Knetsch,
and Goldstein are representative of the major developments of judicial
doctrine dealing with the abuse of the interest deduction prior to the issuance
of Revenue Ruling 68-643. 59 The Commissioner's attack in these cases was
not leveled at the fact that interest was prepaid, but at the substance of the
transaction giving rise to the interest deduction.
D. Tax Avoidance Through the Real Estate Transaction
The prototype transaction in which the interest deduction was exploited to
the fullest extent involved a sale of land in which the buyer made no down-
payment, paying interest in advance for five years. The principal payments
would commence in the sixth year and then would involve a balloon
payment at the end of the amortization period so that only a minimum
amount of non tax-deductible dollars would be invested in the property. The
deduction of large amounts of prepaid interest in real estate transactions
highlighted a tax avoidance loophole in the law existing prior to the issuance
of Revenue Ruling 68-643. In the first place, the hypothesized real estate
(1963). For a complete discussion of the sham transaction doctrine see Comment, Tax
Avoidance Use of the Interest Deduction, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 1218 (1967).
. 55. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967), aff'g 44 T.C.
284 (1965). -..
56. 364 F.2d at 742. The court stated that an interest deduction should be allowed
"when a taxpayer has borrowed funds and incurred an obligation to pay interest in order
to engage in ... purposive activity, even though he decided to borrow in order to gain
an interest deduction rather than to finance the activity in some other way." Id. at 741.
The court indicated what it meant by purposive activity by stating that no deduction
should be allowed when the transaction "has no substance or purpose aside from the
taxpayer's desire to obtain the tax benefit of an interest deduction ..... Id. at 741-
42.
57. Id. In contrast the circuit court decided two companion cases on the ground
that they involved sham transactions and no real indebtedness existed. Barnett v. Com-
missioner, 364 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967), alf'g 44
T.C. 261 (1965); Ippolito v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1005 (1967), aff'g 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 894 (1965). For a criticism of
Goldstein as an unwarranted departure from Knetsch see Comment, supra note 54.
58. 364 F.2d at 742. The Goldstein rationale was further refined by the Second
Circuit in Lifschultz v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 25 CCH Tax
Ct Mem. 1146 (1966). However, application of the principles by other courts has re-
sulted in some confusion regarding the Goldstein decision. See, e.g., Herbert Enoch,
57 T.C. 781 (1972) (reading Goldstein as requiring a "primary purpose" other than
tax motivation); Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404 (Ct, Cl. 1969) (referring
to the "business purpose" test of Goldstein).5 , 190-2 Cvm, BvLL. 76,
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transaction did not involve the artificiality of the Goodstein variety where the
transaction was a sham in the factual sense.0° Since the purchase would
ordinarily give rise to a bona fide indebtedness, it would not be subject to
characterization as a sham.61
A more intriguing problem arose in the context of the tests sets forth in
Knetsch6 2 and particularly Goldstein,6a which dealt with difficult issues
regarding the motives of taxpayers for entering into tax shelter transac-
tions.64 Real estate transactions of the variety discussed were clearly con-
ceived for tax avoidance puposes. However, the significant factor involved in
applying the "purposive activity" test of Goldstein is the existence of some
economic substance apart from the tax savings to be realized.65 A purchase
of real estate involved the ideal conduit for achieving the desired tax
deduction because of the additional purpose of holding real estate for its
appreciation in value. Since the amount of appreciation is 4 matter of
speculation, a court generally would not be able to calculate the non-tax
benefit to the taxpayer as could be done in the transactions involving
investments with a fixed return such as government securities. Thus, in the
real estate purchase the taxpayer was equipped with a strong argument that
the transaction involved "purposive activity" other than tax avoidance and,
therefore, satisfied the Goldstein requirements. 66
E. Revenue Ruling 68-643
The reaction of the Internal Revenue Service to the abuse of the interest
deduction, largely through prepayment in real estate transactions, was the
issuance of Revenue Ruling 68-643.67 The ruling revoked Income Tax
60. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
62. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
63. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967), affg 44 T.C.
284 (1965).
64. See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (taxpayer has a legal
right to seek to decrease his taxes, but the action taken by the taxpayer apart from the
tax motive must be that which the statute intended).
65. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
66. Abuses of this nature may be curtailed to some extent by the limitations imposed
by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163(d) which was added to the Code by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 487. The section places limits on the amount of interest deductible
if it arises in connection with debts incurred to purchase or carry investment property.
The provision was intended to preclude tax avoidance through a mismatching of income
and expense items in situations where a current interest deduction was created through
borrowing large amounts to acquire investment property. The property would produce
capital gains when sold but would generate little current income, thus, the current interest
deduction was used to offset other income. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1969). For a discussion of the provision indicating its limited ap-
plication see Bedell, The Interest Deduction: Its Current Status, 32 NYU INST. TAX.
1117 (1974).
67. 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 76. The ruling itself only refers to "certain abuses which
have arisen with respect to prepayment of interest." Id. However, the use of the deduc-
tion in real estate transactions was widely used and publicized for a short period imme-
diately preceding the ruling. It was not uncommon for national or local newspapers to
carry advertisements offering land for sale detailing the terms and emphasizing the at-
tractiveness of the prepaid interest deduction. This type of transaction became particu-
larly prevalent in Southern California. See Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16




Ruling 374068 and the Commissioner's acquiescence in John D. Fackler6 9
and Court Holding Co.70 The position taken in the ruling is that any
deduction of interest prepaid for a period extending more than twelve
months beyond -the close of the tax year in which the payment was made
constitutes a material distortion of income and will be disallowed. Further-
more, there is no assurance that a deduction will be allowed for prepayments
of interest attributable to periods extending less than twelve months beyond
the close of the year of payment since the ruling states that such prepay-
ments will be considered on a case-by-case basis. For the determination of
the material distortion issue in these cases the ruling provides: "[S]ome of
the factors to be considered .. include but are not limited to the amount of
income in the taxable year of payment, the income of previous taxable years,
the amount of prepaid interest, the time of payment, the reason for
prepayment, and the existence of a varying rate of interest over the term of
the loan."'1 The ruling does not include a statement of the manner in which
the factors are to be applied or an indication of their relative importance.
The conclusion that a material distortion of income has resulted from a
prepayment of interest, either through the conclusive presumption if the
payment extends to a period of more than twelve months beyond the year of
payment or through the application of the listed factors for shorter periods,
moves the Commissioner into a position to require that the taxpayer's
method of accounting be changed so as to clearly reflect income under
section 446(b). 72 The result is that the prepaid interest must be accrued
ratably over the life of the loan and, thus, the cash basis taxpayer is placed
on the accrual method of accounting with respect to the prepaid interest,
while remaining on the cash receipts and disbursements method for other
items.73 However, the critical issue presented in Revenue Ruling 68-643 is
whether a prepayment of interest materially distorts income. One of the
questionable aspects of the ruling is its approach to resolving the material
distortion issue, particularly the position that prepayments for interest accru-
ing beyond the twelve-month period after the tax year automatically cause a
distortion of the taxpayer's income.
III. PREPAID INTEREST SINCE THE 1968 RULING
The most striking aspect of the law of prepaid interest in recent years is
the distinct absence of judicia] reliance on Revenue Ruling 68-643. -In
68. 1945 CuM. BULL. 109; see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
69. 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939 CuM. BULL. 11.
70. 2 T.C. 531 (1943), acquiesced in, 1943 CuM. BULL. 5.
71. 1968-2.CUM. BULL. 76.
72. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(b).
73. The taxpayer is placed on a "hybrid" method of accounting which is what the
Tax Court objected to in John D. Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939
CuM. BULL. 11. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text. However, section
446(b) appears to sanction this result, stating that permissible methods of accounting
include "any combination of the foregoing methods [including both cash and accrual
methods] permitted under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate." INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(c)(4). See also Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128
(1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club
v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
[Vol. 29
COMMENTS
contrast, some congressional sanction of the ruling is indicated by a state-
ment issued by the House Ways and Means Committee:
Your committee's attention was also called to the matter of deductions
for prepaid interest. On November 26, 1968, 'the Internal Revenue
Service issued a ruling which held that any prepayment for prepaid
interest which would materially distort income . . .should be allowed
only on the accrual basis. This ruling is in accord with the treatment
given other prepayments of expenses and is in 'accord with your Com-
mittee's concept of the law. Thus, it does not seem necessary to in-
clude a provision in the bill to deal with this problem.74
However, the committee report is not a binding statement of the law and in
the absence of legislation it remains for the courts to determine the validity
of the revenue ruling.75 A discussion of several cases decided since the
issuance of the ruling provides an indication of the judicial attitude toward
the ruling and the future acceptance or rejection thereof. 76
A. Failure To Reach the Material Distortion Issue
The prepaid interest cases which have arisen since 1968 have, for the
most part, neither relied upon the ruling nor dealt with the material
distortion theory. However, several of these cases revealed that a material
distortion of income may have resulted had the deduction been allowed. The
decisions, in cases where the result was a disallowance of the deduction,
turned upon a failure to meet the requirements of section 163. 7 7 Thus,
reliance was placed on the law pertaining to the allowance of an interest
deduction in general, as did the pre-1968 cases,78 rather than relying on a
particular theory affecting the deductibility of prepaid interest alone.
In Norman Titcher79 the Tax Court disallowed a claimed deduction for
prepaid interest because the payment "was not in fact paid as 'interest' on
'indebtedness' . . . but rather represented in substance the major part of the
down payment on the purchase price and was merely dressed up to look like
'interest.' "80 The crucial factor in Titcher was that the taxpayer's alleged
"interest" payment was made prior to the consummation of the sale, when an
indebtedness did not exist. In Estate of Martin 'Melcher81 the claimed
deduction for fifteen years of prepaid interest was disallowed on the grounds
that the entire transaction was a sham and, therefore, there was no bona fide
indebtedness on which interest could arise.82 -In that case, a corporation
74. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
75. Although revenue rulings are published to be used as precedent in the disposition
of cases they are not binding on the courts. See Stubbs, Overbeck, & Assoc. v. United
States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hall, 398 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.
1968). For proposed legislation included in the Tax Equity Act of 1975 which would
allow the deduction of interest only as it accrued, thus eliminating the tax advantage
of prepaying interest, see H.R. 1040, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
76. See notes 77-98 infra and accompanying text.
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163; see notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 46-59 supra and accompanying text.
79. 57 T.C. 315 (1971).
80. Id. at 322.




which was controlled by the taxpayer acquired a residence for $85,000
which was resold to the taxpayer for $110,000. The taxpayer obtained a
loan of $80,000 to pay for the house and prepaid interest for fifteen years on
the loan in the amount of $76,000. The court found that the acquisition by
the corporation was a sham because in reality there was only one transac-
tion. In substance the taxpayer rather than the corporation originally ac-
quired the residence. 83 In both Melcher and Titcher the court ruled that the
facts fitted within well-established interpretations of section 163 and, thus,
did not approach the material distortion issue or Revenue Ruling 68-643.
Kenneth D. La Croix8 4 was a recent Tax Court decision in which the
claimed deduction of prepaid interest was disallowed on the theory that the
payment was in reality a deposit or a downpayment of principal. The
taxpayer had purchased an office building for the sum of $1,300,000. A
payment of $250,000 designated as "prepaid interest" was made and
additional interest was to accrue at the rate of 6.6 percent per annum. The
agreement provided that each year a $25,000 credit would "be given for
interest paid in advance by reducing the then outstanding principal balance
due."" 5 The court accepted the Commissioner's argument that $250,000 was
not a payment of interest but was in substance a deposit or downpayment on
the principal balance. The court stated that the payment labeled "prepaid'
interest" was merely "an artifact to provide the petitioners with a means of
lowering their taxes."' 6 In support of the result the court observed two
peculiar aspects of the transaction. First, the court found it difficult to
believe that a transaction so large would have no downpayment whatsoever.
Second, the market rate of interest was 8.0 percent at the time of the sale in
contrast to the 6.6 percent called for in the agreement. The court noted that
by treating the $250,000 payment as principal the rate would be effectively
raised to approximately 8.0 percent.
In light of the particular facts of La Croix the decision adds no new theory
of broad applicability to prepaid interest cases. However, in Andrew A.
Sandor87 the Tax Court advanced a deposit theory which would in effect
require the interest deduction to be taken as accrued on the ground that the
payment was actually a deposit to be applied as interest when earned in the
future.88 The Sandor rationale is somewhat broader than that in La Croix
83. Id.
84. 61 T.C. 471 (1974).
85. Id. at 475 (emphasis added by court).
86. Id.-at 481. The court quoted from the decision in United States v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 366 U.S. 380, 391 (1961): " Payment' is not a talismanic word. It may
have many meanings depending on the sense and context in which it is used. As cor-
rectly observed by the Court of Appeals, 'a payment may constitute a .capital expendi-
ture, an exchange of assets, a prepaid expense, a deposit, or a current expense .
61 T.C. at.479 (emphasis added by the court).
87. 62 T.C. 469 (1974).
88. The court stated that "i]t would be quite plausible to consider the prepaid inter-
est as a deposit to be applied as interest when earned in the future, rather than a pay-
ment of interest in 1968." Id. at 482. The deposit theory as applied to the prepayment
of interest is drawn from an analogy to cases involving the denial of a deduction for
the prepayment of cattle feed. See, e.g., Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. 54 (1965), aff'd per




since there was no provision by the parties to the transaction that the
payment be credited periodically to reduce the principal balance. Ultimately
Sandor turned on the issue of material distortion. The deposit theory was
merely offered as support for the result reached, but it indicates the
development of a viable theory regarding the deduction of prepaid interest.
Although Titcher, Melcher, and La Croix never explicitly reached the
material distortion issue, the possibility of a distortion of income existed had
the deductions been allowed. However, the courts declined to express their
affirmance or disapproval of Revenue Ruling 68-643. In contrast, the
determinative issue in Andrew A. Sandors 9 was whether a material distortion
of income existed. Thus, the Tax Court's approach to Revenue Ruling
68-643 is highly significant.
B. The Sandor Approach to Material Distortion
In Andrew A. Sandor9° a cash basis taxpayer had borrowed $100,000 to
enable him to engage in certain securities transactions. He claimed a
deduction for a payment of five years interest in advance on the loan,
amounting to roughly $38,000. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction
stating that under section 446 it would materially distort taxable income in
the year of payment. The issues stipulated by the parties went a step further
than the question of whether income was materially distorted, specifically
drawing into question the validity of Revenue Ruling 68-643. 9 1 The court,
however, noted that the only issue to be decided was whether the taxpayer
could deduct the prepaid interest, and held that the claimed deduction would
in this case materially distort income and must, therefore, be disallowed.
9 2
With respect to Revenue Ruling 68-643, the court discussed at some
length the authority of the Commissioner to issue the ruling and concluded
that he had not overstepped this authority in dealing with the prepaid
interest deduction through the mechanism of section 446(b).9 3 The court
stated that Congress did not intend that a deduction for prepaid interest be
allowed when such allowance would result in a distortion of income.
According to the court, section 163 must be read in light of section 446 and
89. 62 T.C. 469 (1974).
90. Id.
91. The court recited the stipulated issues: ",[w]hether petitioners' deduction of 5
years' prepaid interest should be disallowed pursuant to Rev. Rul. 68-643 . . . [and]
[w]hether Rev. Rul. 68-643 was a proper exercise of the rule-making authority of the
Commissioner." Id. at 470.
92. Id. at 481. Stating that the situation in this case was not controlled by the prin-
ciples of cases such as Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967), af'g 44 T.C. 284 (1965), the court in Sandor found that
the transaction "had economic reality, gave rise to a true indebtedness from petitioner
to the bank, and that the amounts here involved were paid as interest on that indebted-
ness." 62 T.C. at 474.
Additional support for the proposition that the allowance of the interest deduction be
subjected to the requirement that income be clearly reflected was drawn by analogy to
the treatment of other prepaid expenses. The court found particularly persuasive the
parallel between prepaid interest and prepaid rent and stated that prepaid rent is not
deductible in the year paid because of the likelihood that the deduction would result in
a material distortion. 62 T.C. at 480. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
93. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(b).
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461,9 4 thus subjecting the timing of interest deductions to the requirement that
the method of accounting clearly reflect income. 95 In reaching this conclu-
sion the court quoted a statement included in both a House and a Senate
Committee report dealing with section 461: "Section 461 adopts the provi-
sion of section 43 of the 1939 Code in rearranged form. The timing of
deductions and credits otherwise allowable is determined by the taxpayer's
method of accounting. The method must clearly reflect the income of the
taxpayer.' 99
The significant aspect of the decision, however, is the approach taken by
the court in determining whether a material distortion of income existed. The
disallowance of the claimed deduction rested upon the court's own determi-
nation that a material distortion would result, rather than on an application
of the standards set forth in Revenue Ruling 68-643. The court refused to
adopt the conclusive presumption established in the ruling that a material
distortion automatically results where interest is prepaid for more than one
year beyond the year of payment, stating:
[W]e are not prepared to say that a deduction of any prepaid interest
extending beyond a period of 12 months following the year of payment
would distort income under all circumstances and justify changing a
taxpayer's method of accounting with respect to the prepaid interest
item. This would be ruling in advance of any knowledge of the facts
and circumstances. We believe the Revenue Service may be called
upon to support its determinations in some such cases. 97
The divergence of the holding from the position taken in the revenue ruling
is found in the court's unwillingness to rule "in advance of any knowledge of
the facts and circumstances, '9 8 in contrast to the premise of the ruling that a
material distortion results regardless of the circumstances other than the
single fact that interest is prepaid for more than one year beyond the year of
payment.
IV. THEORIES OF DISALLOWANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
A variety of situations may arise in the context of real estate purchases,
and the appropriate treatment of the prepaid interest deduction will depend
94. id. § 461(a) provides that "[tlhe amount of any deduction or credit . . . shall
be taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under the method of ac-
counting used in computing taxable income."
95. The argument to the contrary was rejected by the court. It is based on the dele-
tion of a phrase in the enactment of § 461(a). Section 43 of the 1939 Code provided:
"The deductions and credits . . . provided for in this title shall be taken for the taxable
year in which 'paid or accrued' . . . dependent upon the method of accounting upon the
basis of which the net income is computed . . . unless in order to clearly reflect income
the deductions or credits should be taken as of a different period." INT. REV. CODE OF
1939, 53 Stat. 1, 4 (emphasis added). The clause beginning "unless in order to clearly
reflect income" was not included in § 461(a) of the 1954 Code, but the court concluded
that no substantive change was intended.
96. 62 T.C. at 478, quoting H.R. REP. No. 353, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) (emphasis added by the court).




upon the circumstances of each particular transaction. The material distor-
tion theory, upon which the 1968 revenue ruling is based, must be contrasted
to other theories for the disallowance of the prepaid interest deduction.
These theories are not only conceptually distinct, but they also may have
important differences in result as to whether a prepayment, if disallowed as a
current deduction, must be entirely disallowed or may be amortized over the
period of the loan.
The interest deduction in tax-shelter real estate purchases involving large
prepayments of interest may clearly be disallowed on the grounds that a
material distortion of income results, whether through an application of the
standards set forth in Revenue Ruling 68-643 or through an independent
determination by the court as was the approach in Andrew A. Sandor.99 The
result is that the deduction must be taken over time as the interest is earned.
The same result would be reached if one of several other theories were
applied. For example, the current deduction of prepaid interest might be
disallowed if a capitalization theory were accepted as is applied to other
prepaid expenses such as rent and insurance premiums. 100 Amortization
would be required so that the deduction would be spread over the term of
the loan. Similarly, if the prepayment were refundable a current deduction
might be disallowed on the theory that funds advanced were not a payment
of interest but merely a deposit to be applied as interest is earned. Again, the
deduction would in effect be amortized over the life of the loan.
Eich of these theories has a common problem. If the prepaid interest is the
economic equivalent of a downpayment of principal, and is made in lieu
thereof, then the proper result would be the total disallowance of the
deduction rather than a deferral of the deduction. Characterization of the
payment as principal was the approach in Kenneth D. La Croix.'0 ' Al-
though that case could be limited to its peculiar fact situation, its rationale is
highly appropriate for dealing with tax avoidance transactions which involve
large prepayments of interest with little or no downpayment and which
caused the concern of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 68-643. However, the validity of this theory diminishes in
dealing with transactions involving more than a nominal amount of down-
payment and, thus, may not be left to stand alone against the variety of
prepaid interest transactions which may arise.
Another hypothetical real estate transaction illustrates the deficiency of
the Service's approach in Revenue Ruling 68-643. A transaction may be
conceived which involves a purchase of property with a substantial downpay-
ment of principal and a prepayment of several years oE interest on an
indebtedness relatively small in comparison to the total purchase price. This
situation is posed not because of the frequency of its occurrence but because
it highlights an irrational aspect of the 1968 ruling. It is evident that the
described situation could easily result in very little actual distortios of
99. Id. at 469; -see text accompanying note 97 supra.
100. See notes 26-34 supra and accompanying text.
101. 61 T.C. 471 (1974). See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
1975]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
income. However, the amount of the prepaid interest is considered irrelevant
by the Service if the interest applies to a period more than one year beyond
the year of payment. The fallacy of this approach is further illustrated by
contrasting the Service's position regarding the deductibility of mortgage
points and other loan fees to the position taken in Revenue Ruling 68-643.
In 1969 the Service issued Revenue Ruling .69-188102 which stated that the
-payment of mortgage points would constitute interest. Since mortgage points
and fees may represent interest for the term of the loan they will usually be
attributable to periods extending more than twelve months beyond the end of
the tax year. However, in Revenue Ruling 69-582103 the Service took the
position that points paid in connection with a mortgage, provided that the
interest rate and points were set through arm's-length bargaining, would not
be considered to distort income materially. Thus, the points may be deducted
in full in the year in which they are paid. The Service's position on the
deductibility of points may be rationalized on the theory that the payments
are de minimis and, therefore, would not cause a significant distortion of
income. The de minimis rationale should be equally applicable to prepay-
ments of interest in small amounts regardless of the period of time to which
the interest relates.
Although -the de minimis rationalization is useful to point up logical
inconsistencies in the Service's positions, it is relatively insignificant from a
practical standpoint, particularly with respect to real estate transactions. It is
likely that the indebtedness on which an interest prepayment is made will be
of substantial size in proportion to the entire purchase price. In such a
transaction, assuming that a realistic downpayment of principal is made, the
acceptance or rejection of the conclusive presumption approach to material
distortion becomes most critical. The determination of whether or not a
material distortion of income would actually result from a prepayment of
interest in such a transaction logically would be reached from an examina-
tion of all the facts and circumstances. For example, if the taxpayer
consistently prepaid interest on a regular basis in similar transactions, it
would reduce the likelihood that his income would be materially distorted. In
addition, the taxpayer's income in relation to the amount of prepayment
would be highly determinative in assessing whether income would be materi-
ally distorted. Furthermore, if the income is abnormally high in the year of
payment, the possibility of a material distortion would increase since the
effect would be to shift current income into future years in which the income
bracket would be expected to be lower. The Service demonstrates its
awareness of factors such as these by listing a number of them in Revenue
Ruling 68-643.104 However, they are considered relevant only to prepay-
ments applicable to periods of less than one year beyond the year of
payment. The position that the factors are totally immaterial for prepay-
ments applicable to longer periods cannot be supported by logic or necessity.
102. 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 54.
103. 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 29.




The development and direction of the law in respect to the deductibility of
prepaid interest is best understood when examined in conjunction with the
real estate transaction involving a prepayment of interest. The widespread
abuse of the interest deduction through these transactions led the Internal
Revenue Service to reverse a long-standing position regarding the deducti-
bility of prepaid interest. The issuance of Revenue Ruling 68-643 was an
unfortunate reaction to these abuses. In part, however, the ruling provided
some badly needed changes in the Service's position, in particular the
revocation of Income Tax Ruling 3740.105
The use of prepaid interest in real estate transactions often created a
situation which clearly involved tax avoidance through exploitation of the
interest deduction. But the transactions often went unchallenged by the
Commissioner because the transaction and the indebtedness were bona fide,
there was an actual payment of interest, and there was economic purpose for
the transaction other than tax avoidance. One objectionable feature of these
transactions was that they often seriously distorted the taxpayer's income.
However, the existence of Income Tax Ruling 3740 precluded the disallow-
ance of the deduction on the grounds that a material distortion of income
would result, relegating the Commissioner to arguments attacking the bona
fides of the underlying transaction based on the principles of cases such as
Goodstein, Knetsch, or Goldstein.100 At this point the Service should have
merely revoked Income Tax Ruling 3740, thus making available the materi-
al distortion challenge to curtail abusive transactions. The additional attempt
to establish a conclusive presumption that material distortion results where
interest is prepaid for periods more than twelve months beyond the year of
payment is an artificial solution to the complex problem of when a material
distortion of income exists. Such a solution should not be followed by the
courts.
For the most part, the courts have avoided passing on the validity of the
1968 ruling primarily because the cases have presented fact situations which
could be resolved without reaching the material distortion question. How-
ever, several of these cases could have easily been treated within Revenue
Ruling 68-643 had the courts been anxious to approve the ruling. Further-
more, the approach of the court in Andrew A. Sandor,10 7 where the court
determined independently of Revenue Ruling 68-643 that a material distor-
tion existed, is correct and should be followed. If the courts require the
Commissioner to support his determination that a material distortion of
income exists, the conclusive presumption stated in the Revenue Ruling is
emasculated. The abstention of the courts from indicating their approval of
the ruling in cases presenting an opportunity to do so, and particularly the
well-conceived approach in Sandor, indicates that the presumption of the
ruling may not be followed in future decisions.
105. 1945 CuM. BuLL. 109.
106. See notes 47-59 supra and accompanying text.
107. 62 T.C. 469 (1974).
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Although the treatment of Revenue Ruling 68-643 by the courts indicates
a failure to accept the Service's approach to the material distortion issue, the
advisability of taking a prepaid interest deduction remains questionable at
best. As long as the Service maintains the position taken in the ruling,
prepayment of interest invites a challenge by the Commissioner. The courts
should explicitly reject that aspect of the ruling establishing the conclusive
presumption of material distortion and thereby cause the Service to revise the
position taken in the revenue ruling. Such action would mean that prepaid
interest would be deductible in certain legitimate transactions, subject to the
limitation that a material distortion of income may not result.
